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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif{-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

ERSELL HARRIS, JR.,
Def eandant-A ppellant.

12424

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEl\IENT OF
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ersell Harris, Jr. appeals from a
i11r>' \"erdict entered against him in the Third Judicial
District Court, convicting him of forgery.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted of forgery before the
Honorable l\Ierrill C. Faux, in Third Judicial District
Co11rl, on September 29, 1970. He was sentenced to
~PITe the indeterminate sentence as provided by law.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
. The res~)ondent respectfully submits that the deri
s1ons and rulmgs of the Court below should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 17, 1969, appellant stood trial j11
Criminal Case No. 20544 in the Third District Court
before the Honorable D. Frank 'i\Tilkins. He 11,3,
charged with uttering a fictitious check in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953) (R. 3, 48). Tlie
jury was impaneled ( R. 4), exhibits were introduced
( R. 10) , and witnesses were sworn and testified. After ·
the defense rested, a motion to dismiss the case was madt
by the defense. The court granted the motion on tne
grounds that according to to the Utah Supreme Court
decision in State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 98; :
( 1969), appellant had been ~barged under the \\Toni
statute. He should have geen charged with forgery under
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-26-1 (R. 75-77).
Appellant testified for the record his approral ol
the action when being questioned by his attorney, )!i
Jay Barney.
"Mr. Barney: And I have consulted wi~h
you regarding this particular motion for a dis·
missal of this case, have I not?
Mr. Harris: Yes, sir.
Mr. Barney: You understand t~at the
state may still file a new charge on this case,

:
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and it may be that of forgery, which would
carry a penalty of one to twenty years?
l\Ir. Harris: Yes.
l\Ir. Barney: Nevertheless it is your desire, and was and is your desire that we proceed
on your motion to dismiss, and, have your case
dismissed at this time, is that correct?
l\Ir. Harris: Yes.

The Court: l\Iotion granted." (R. of
Criminal No. 20544, 75-76).
Subsequently, on September 28, 1970, appellant
was brought before Judge Merrill Faux in Criminal
Case No. 22177 in the Third District Court charged
with forging a check in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-26-1 ( 1953) ( R. 5) . The defense made a motion
to the court to dismiss on the grounds of former
jeopardy, which motion was denied (R. 15, 51). A jury
of' his peers found him guilty as charged September
Z9, 1970.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOP AR-

DY \VAS NOT AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT
AS HE KNOWINGLY CONSENTED TO THE
DISMISSAL OF THE JURY IN THE FIRST
TRIAL ON HIS COUNSEL'S MOTION.

Respondent agrees with appellant that the double

4

jeopardy standard
imposed by the Fifth Am endn;ent
.
of• the
Umted
States
Constitution is applicable to stat1
.
•
c1:1mmal prosecutions. For the moment, respondent will
discuss the matter at hand as though the two crimes of
which appellant was accused in the two different trial.i
were sufficiently alike so as to be considered one (a contention disputed in Point II). That would put the case
in the general category of a mistrial declared by tne
trial judge on defendant's motion and with his knowing consent as the record of the first trial indicates (R.
75-77). A vast majority of jurisdictions including Utan
hold that in those circumstances the constitutional plea
of former jeopardy is no defense. See, for example.
People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118, 22 P.2d 526 (1933):
State v. Arnold, 142 Kan. 589, 50 P.2d 1008 (193jJ:
Commonwealth v. Compopiano, 254 Mass 560, 150X.E.
844 ( 1926) ; Leigh v. United States, 329 F.2d 883
(D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Gori, 282 F.2dl:l ,
(2nd Cir. 1960), upheld 367 U.S. 364, 6 L.Ed.2d 901.
81 S.Ct. 1523 ( 1961). People v. Kern, 8 Utah 268, 30
P.988 (1892).
Even had appellant objected to the dismissal ot' ,
the jury, the circumstances are similar enough to the
case of Illinois v. Somerville, ______ U.S ...... ., 35 L.Ed.j/
425, 93 S.Ct. 1066 (1973), for it to be controlling.

There, the defendant was brought to trial under a d~
.
. .
f ecbve
md1ctment
t hat cou Id n 't be amended under JI.
linois law. That defect could have been asserted on W
·f
The tr1a1
peal to overturn a judgment of conv1c 10n.
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judge declared a mistrial and dismissed the case over
the defendant's objection. Subsequently, the defendant
was reiudicted, tried, and convicted.
The United States Supreme Court held that the
derlaration of a mistrial was required by the "manifest
necessit:·/' and the "ends of public justice" test of
l'11itcrl States t'. Perez, 9 'i\Theat. 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed.
:?d 16.5 ( 1824). Therefore, double jeopardy was no defense.
Tlw following reasoning of the court is especially
pertinent to the case at hand:
"A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial
verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conYiction be reached but would have to be reversed
on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in
the trial. If an error would make a reversal
on appeal a certainty, it would not serve 'the
ends of public justice' to require that the Government proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically
be stripped of that success by an appellate
court." 35 L.Ed.2d at 431.

And further,

If a mistrial were constitutionally unavailable in situations such as this, the State's policy
could only be implemented by conducting a
second trial after verdict and reversal on appeal, thus wasting time, energy, and money for

6

all concerned."
35 L.Ed.2d at 432 , 433 . see
.
a l so, S. zmpson v. United States, 229 F. 940
9th Cir. 1916).
That the Somerville, supra, situation existed in the
c~se at bar, .is clear from trial Judge vVilkins' exp Jana.
hon to the Jury of why he was dismissing the case.
"I am dismissing it [the case] because in
my opinion, according to a [Utah] Supreme
Court case that just came out ... the man has
been charged under the wrong criminal statute
... the charge should be that of forgery; not
fictitious check."
Under those circumstances, a guilty verdict most
certainly would have been overturned on apeal followed
by a new trial. That would be possible as such an appeal
from a guilty verdict acts as a waiver of the defense of
former jeopardy. See, United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S.
463 (1964).
Judge Wilkins used his discretion wisely in dismis
sing the suit on appellant's motion and the court in su~
sequent forgery trial should not be overruled in its decision not to allow the defense of former jeopardy.
POINT II
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY EXISTED AS
A DEFENSE FOR THE TWO OFFENSES OF
'VHICH HE YV AS CHARGED AS THE T":o
TRIALS 'VERE DISTINCTLY DIFF'ERE~T
OFFEXSES.

7
It is ffell-estahlishecl that the plea of former jeopardy applies onlr to a second prosecution for the same
ad and crime both in law and fact. As the Supreme
Court stated it:

"Under the doctrine of former jeopardy
. if the two actions were for the same offense, the former was a complete bar to the
latter, but if they were not the same offense,
the former was no bar to any element of the
latter, eYen though such element was common
to both actions." State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah
63, 157 p .2d 2.58 ( 194.5) .
As the facts of this case show, in the first trial
appellant was charged with uttering a fictitious check
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 ( 1953). In the second
trial he was charged with forging a check under Utah
Code Ann. § 7 6-26-1 ( 1953) .
"That the offense of uttering a fictitious
instrument . . . is a separate and distinct offense from that of uttering a forged instrument . . . has been definitely settled by this
court as well as many others." State v. Jensen,
103 Utah 478, 483, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).

In a more recent case of State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d
211, 450 P.2d 987 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court
distinguished once more the two separate offenses by
showing that different elements make up each offense.
Explieitly, where the check is one with a heading of
an existing company, then there is a forgery. That cov-
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ers the case at han<l. \Vhereas an uttering of r·
'
a !Cit·
tious check implies a nonexistent company. State v. FoJ
supra.
Therefore, it is plain that appellant's contentionor
double jeopardy is groundless. He was charged ,11th
two distinctly different offenses that had differente]e.
ments. The trial court committed no error in not allow.
ing the defense of former jeopardy to be a bar to appellant's prosecution at the second trial.
POI~T

III

THE

APPELLANT RECEIVED ADE
(~UATE
AND COl\IPETENT DEFENSE
COUNSEL DURING HIS TRIAL FOR FORGERY.
The right to effective or adequate assistance nf
counsel was first enunciated by the United States Su·
preme Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 65. i2
L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 ( 1932), which held that failure
to make an effective appointment of counsel violates
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is a denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
~d
. view
· m
· S ta t e v. H'zne,s 6 l1··,
Utah adopte d t his
01
126, 307 P .2d 887 ( 1957) , holding that the privilege
an accused to the assistance of counsel is one of the fun· ,
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damental rights, meaning the assistance of a reputable
member of the bar who is willing and in a position to
honestly and conscientiously represent the interests of
tbr defendant. In Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118, 449 P.
"Ld :!.J.1 ( 1969), the Court held that a failure to be prornlcrl effective assistace of counsel results in a denial
of due process. See Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the
T'tah Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has left to the
state and lower courts the task of setting standards of
trial attorney eff'ectiveness. If the standard be too strict,
the defendant could he denied due process, but if too
liberal, there is the threat of a stampede of prisoners
daiming that their attorneys were not effective merely
because they were not acquitted.
California's standard of legal competency requires
the petitioner to show that the trial was reduced to a
farC'e or shun through the attorney's lack of competence,
diligence or knowledge of the law. See In re Beaty, 64
Cal. :!cl 7GO, 414 P. 2d 817, 51 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966).

In Arizona, the Court allows a contention of deprirntion of right to counsel to be asserted sufficient in
only extreme cases. There must be facts to indicate that
the attorney's performance was so substandard as to
render the trial a farce or sham. See Barron v. State, 7
Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
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Kansas has also adopted an extremely strict standard. In JI cGee 'l'. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d i "
9
·
( 1962) , the Court said:
" ... the burden is cast upon the petitioner
to show that his counsel was so incompetent
and inadequate in representing him that the
total effect was that of a complete absence of
counsel." Id. at 618, 795.
In 1'Vashington 'l'. 1'urner, 17 U.2d 361, 412 P. 2n
449 ( 1966), the Court looked to the record for sugges·

tions of "bad faith conduct" on the part of the attorney.
This concept of "bad faith" was defined in Alires v.
1'urner, supra, as follows:
"The [due process] requirement [of coun·
sel] is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of
an appearance in the record by an attorney
who manifests no real concern about the in·
terests of the accused." (Emphasis added.) Id.
at 121, 243.
This Court also warned in Jaramillo v. Turner, 2!

U. 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343 (1970):
". . . in order to prevent further erosion
of the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States and to revive the memory of
what was originally intended by the Sixth
Amendment thereto, we wish to address a few
remarks to the new claim of inadequate representa tion by his layer.
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"To begin with, this is usually but a loophole through which guilty men hope to escape
from the debts which they owe to society for
past criminal beavior. It is a loophole through
which other guilty men have escaped from their
just desserts under the law, and it is a loophole through which guilty men will be released
to prey upon law-abiding citizens unless courts
look more carefully at the requirements of
the Constitution as set forth therein." Id. at 21,

344.

By these standards, the record reveals that the trial
was not a farce or a sham. This is especially true when
the only claim of incompetency is the failure to raise
the defense of double jeopardy. It has clearly been
shown that at very best such a defense had an extremely questionable legal foundation. Point I and II demonstrate that, in fact, no former jeopardy defense was
ever available to appellant. Therefore, the conviction
cannot be justifiably overturned on the basis of incompetent counsel.

CONCLUSION
Appellant received a fair trial represented adequately by counsel. Never did he have the defense of double
jeopardy available to him due to his own acts of consent
to the dismissal of the first case and due to the fact that
the two sections of the Utah Code delineate two dis-

12

inctly dif'f erent crimes. For these reasons, respondent
respectfully submits that the conviction of Ersell
Harris, Jr., should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Chief Assistant Attorney General
M. REID RUSSELL
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

